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Abstrat. This paper douments a ase study in the development of
a Java Card appliation and desribes some related seurity issues. An
implementation of a simplied eletroni voting system is presented, in
whih a server residing on the Internet is able to authentiate registered
voters based on information enrypted by a Java Card smart ard. Al-
though this work is done in the ontext of a larger projet, in whih
veriation is the main goal, the paper fouses on the tehnial aspets
of the implementation. Yet, it also addresses more general issues, suh
as how to design and analyze seure Java Card applets and host appli-
ations.
1 Introdution
As more and more transations are performed over the Internet, the problem of
authentiation beomes inreasingly important. Common authentiation proto-
ols rely on publi key ryptography, involving keys of typially 1024 bits. Suh
keys have to be distributed to the dierent parties over an untrusted hannel
without ompromising the protool. Moreover, the keys have to be stored on a
omputer sine humans are not partiularly good at remembering large prime
numbers. Smart ards are the perfet arriers for suh large keys. Sine the ryp-
tographi algorithms are performed on the ards themselves, the keys never have
to leave the ard. This paper disusses how smart ards, and more preisely Java
Card smart ards, an be used to implement a (drastially simplied) eletroni
voting system.
Generally speaking, Java Card [4℄ is neither a subset nor a superset of the
Java language [9℄. On the one hand, Java Card laks features like multithread-
ing, garbage olletion, and multidimensional arrays and primitive types suh
as float and long. On the other hand, the Java Card run-time system is dif-
ferent from Java's run-time system, sine it has to deal with persistent memory.
Furthermore, the standard libraries that ome with Java and Java Card dier
in the lasses and interfaes they oer the programmer. Nevertheless, the two
languages are similar in style, and learly very losely related.
The voting ase study disussed in Setion 5 onsists of a 100% pure Java
solution. What makes Java or Java Card so suitable for this problem? Features
like objet-orientation, exeption handling, and a large library of predened
lasses (network, ryptography, seurity, GUI) make it possible to implement
high level protools relatively easily. Moreover, Java's semantis are reasonably
well understood. Veriation of the orretness of Java lasses is possible using
the tools developed within our group, the LOOP group in Nijmegen [11℄, but
also with other tools suh as Bandera [5℄, ESC [7℄, and Jive [15℄.
The goals of this paper are twofold. On the one hand, it attempts to reord
the tehnial details enountered so far in developing a onrete smart ard ap-
pliation. Setion 2 provides some tehnial details on the setup and the ards
and libraries that were used. Setion 4 explains how to implement seurity pro-
tools based on strong ryptography in Java. Setion 5 presents the eletroni
voting system ase study. The ase study on eletroni voting is doumented,
so that it is lear what protool was hosen, whih APIs were used, et. On the
other hand, the paper studies the state-of-the-art in design and analysis of safe
and orret smart ard appliation. Setion 3 disusses some of the issues in
designing Java Card applets and host appliations. Setion 6 presents the on-
lusions and ontains a disussion about future researh. An important question
that is left for future researh is: Is veriation of orretness of Java appliations
enough, or is a high-level formalism needed to verify the seurity protool?
2 Enabling Tehnologies
This setion desribes the steps neessary to set up a omputer suited for devel-
oping Java based smart ard appliations. The desription is based on experiene
with some onrete smart ards and assoiated hardware, whih are disussed
in detail. It is not meant to be an exhaustive aount of urrently available solu-
tions, nor is it intended to be a omparison of the ards that are disussed. The
purpose of this setion is merely to give a avor of the kind of preparatory work
involved in developing a Java Card appliation.
A Java Card appliation onsists of a ard-resident part (the applet) and a
ard-external part (the host appliation). In fat, a ard an ontain many ap-
plets belonging to dierent Java Card appliations thus making the ard \mul-
tipurpose". One the ard has been issued, the applets run on the Java virtual
mahine on the ard itself. The host appliation runs on an ordinary omputer,
and may therefore be implemented in an arbitrary language. However, for the
purposes of this paper, we restrit ourselves to Java based host appliations. In
this way, both the host appliation and the applets an be developed on the
same omputer.
Our setup for developing the appliation onsists of a Linux workstation
with ard terminal attahed to the serial port. It is assumed that Java SDK
1.3 is installed on this mahine. Both the applet and the host appliation use
additional libraries. Fortunately, this merely involves opying some jar les into
the $JDK/jre/lib/ext diretory. The interfaes to Java libraries are known as
Appliation Programmer's Interfaes, or APIs.
The rst step is to enable Java to ommuniate with the serial ports. For this
purpose, Sun provides the JavaComm API [20℄. However, before JavaComm an
be installed, the RXTX pakage [12℄, whih onnets the Linux serial port devie
to JavaComm, has to be installed, this is beause the Sun implementation of
JavaComm only supports Windows or Solaris mahines. To let JavaComm know
about RXTX, the following line is put in the javax.omm.properties le (this
le should be in $JDK/jre/lib).
Driver=gnu.io.RXTXCommDriver
To allow any user (not just root) to use serial ports, this user should be a
member of the uup group. Also the permissions of the /var/lok diretory
and the /dev/ttyS? devies may ause problems.
Host appliation development requires installation of additional APIs. If the
Java Card appliation uses ryptography, for example, the JCE API may be very
useful; this API is disussed in Setion 4. Obviously, the host appliation needs
the ability to send APDUs (Appliation Protool Data Units) to the ard. The
Open Card Framework (OCF) [16℄, disussed in more detail below, provides this
ability. Furthermore, the host appliation may need to load new applets onto
the ard, or in some other way manage the applets on the ard. The proedure
to do this diers per ard. One initiative to standardize this is the Visa Open
Platform speiation [8℄. All ards onsidered below implement applet loading
through sending appropriate APDU ommands to the ard.
Applet development requires the Java Card API to be installed on the de-
veloper's mahine. The lasses in the Java Card API an be mere stubs
1
, sine
the applet will use the on-ard implementation of the Java Card API, one it
is loaded onto the ard. If the applet is to use additional APIs present on the
ard, for example a GSM API or the Visa Open Platform API, installation of
(stubs for) those APIs on the development mahine is also neessary. All ards
onsidered below omply to the Java Card standard. Note, however, that there
are dierent versions (the urrent Java Card version is 2:1:2).
Using Java for the implementation of both applet and host appliation has
a number of advantages over a mixed language solution. First of all, swithing
between dierent APIs when writing either the applet or host appliation is
diÆult enough writing in the same language. Furthermore, the OCF [16℄, whih
enables us to aess a whole lot of dierent terminals and ards, is written in
Java. Alternatively, we ould take the PC/SC arhiteture, whih is available for
Windows and Linux mahines.
To aess the ard terminal, the OCF API may be used. Alternatively, some
ards ome with their own API for aessing the ard, for instane the OneWire
API below. Note that the standards for both ard and host appliation are
relatively new, and these frameworks and APIs are ontinually being improved.
See Figure 1 for an overview of the APIs that we use.
1
The Java Card referene implementation of Sun may be used to test applets as it
ontains a full implementation of the API whih runs as a smart ard simulator on
top of a Java VM.
JavaComm API
RXTX
OCF API
Java Card API
Applet
Host Appliation
APDUs
Fig. 1. The applet, the host appliation, and the dierent APIs.
One the neessary APIs are installed on the mahine, the OCF API should
be ongured to enable the host appliation to aess ard terminals attahed
to the system. The OCF plays the role of middleware by abstrating away from
onrete ard terminals and smart ards. Its onguration is speied in the
openard.properties le whih should be in $JDK/jre/lib.
There are many dierent terminals on the market. We restrit ourselves to
the Gemplus GCR410 model ard terminal and iButton adaptors. To tell the
framework about these terminals, suitable OCF drivers are installed and the
following lines are added to the openard.properties le.
OpenCard.terminals=\
om.gemplus.openard.terminal.GemplusCardTerminalFatory|\
gr410|GCR410|/dev/ttyS0 \
om.ibutton.o.terminal.jib.iButtonCardTerminalFatory|\
iButtonAdapter|iBUTTON_PORT_TYPE_SERIAL|/dev/ttyS1
A entral notion in OCF is the ard servie. A ard servie speies the fun-
tionality of a related set of smart ards. The PassThruCardServie is about the
simplest ard servie available. The only funtionality it provides is the sending of
APDUs to the ard. This means that all Java Card smart ards an be addressed
by this ard servie. Adding the following lines to the openard.properties le
makes it possible for a host appliation to use the PassThruCardServie:
OpenCard.servies=\
openard.opt.util.PassThruCardServieFatory
The idea behind OCF ard servies, however, is that the host appliation does
not send APDUs itself, instead the ard servie should oer methods whih take
are of low-level APDU ommuniation with the ard. For example, many host
appliations need the ability to load new applets onto the ard whih requires a
ard servie suh as the Visa Open Platform ard servie whih we are develop-
ing.
So far, we have a working OCF system and a working ard terminal, what
about the ards themselves? The following list is a very small subset of all
available ards on the market. Note that we do not draw any onlusions on
whih ard is the best, but merely sum up the ards we ddled with:
{ The Dallas Semiondutor Java Card iButton. These smart \ards" have
a dierent appearane than the ones below, beause the Java Card hip is
ontained in a small button-like metal asing. The Java Card iButtons are
members of the larger iButton family of devies, they omply to Java Card
2.0 with extensions to aess the ryptographi oproessor. The iButtons are
more tamper resistant than onventional smart ards. An iButton ontains
a battery whih is used to ompletely erase its memory when an attempt
is made to open the asing. On the host appliation side Dallas oers two
APIs for managing the applets on a Java Card iButton. The non-OCF-based
OneWire API and the OCF-based iButton API. The former has a broad
support for all (also the non-Java) iButtons, the latter is speially meant
for Java Card iButtons.
{ The Gemplus GemXpresso 211IS. These ards support Java Card 2.1 and
Visa Open Platform. On the host appliation side one an use the Gemplus
software kit (OCF based). A drawbak to this partiular version of the ard
(the international version) is that it does not support the RSA seurity
algorithm due to export regulations.
{ The Shlumberger Palmera Protet V2. These ards have similar speia-
tions as the Gemplus ards, they also support Java Card 2.1 and Visa Open
Platform. Unfortunately, the Shlumberger software kit, needed to load ap-
plets onto the ard, only works under Windows. To overome this we wrote
our own Visa Open Platform ard servie for OCF.
Beause of the many dierent ards and ard terminals it is diÆult to de-
velop host appliations and applets that work on all platforms, despite stan-
dardization eorts like OCF, Visa Open Platform, and Java Card. With all the
dierent setups, the ommuniation and speed of the CPU on the ard remains
a bottlenek. Choosing a ard and ard terminal will probably be an eonomi
hoie.
3 Designing Java Card Appliations
In true objet-oriented fashion, a Java Card applet extends the Applet lass in
order to add spei funtionality to an already existing base funtionality. In
Java Card the programmer overrides the proess method whih reeives data
from the host appliation in the form of a byte array in a spei form, alled an
APDU (Appliation Protool Data Unit). The applet reeives Command APDUs
telling the applet what to do. The applet is able to respond by sending Response
APDUs whih have a dierent form. One ould say that all funtionality of
the applet revolves around the proess method, ignoring the fat that dierent
applets an talk to eah other using the shareable interfae between them. Thus,
Java Card applets are small piees of ode. Moreover, sine they are restrited to
non-threaded behavior, they are well suited for formal veriation. Speiation
of their behavior in terms of bytes is easy.
The following program fragment shows a typial proess method in a Java
Card 2.0 style applet.
publi void proess(APDU apdu) throws ISOExeption {
byte[℄ buffer = apdu.getBuffer();
if((buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA℄ == SELECT_CLA) &&
(buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS℄ == SELECT_INS)) {
return;
}
short bytesLeft = (short) (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_LC℄ & 0x00FF);
short bytesTotal = bytesLeft;
short readCount = apdu.setInomingAndReeive();
swith( buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS℄ ) {
ase INS_SIGN: ....
}
}
A rst glane at the program text learns that programming Java Card applets
fores the programmer to desent to the low level of bits and bytes. The method
rst pulls out the bytes from the APDU, it then performs an input hek on
them, it writes some data at spei osets in loal variables and then does
a ase distintion on the buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS℄ byte whih represents the
instrution or \what-to-do byte". The proess method is the only plae where
APDUs enter the applet
2
. The ode shown above is the most ommon way
to handle APDUs. Implementing the same routine for every applet an beome
somewhat tedious eventually. Future versions of Java Card may support Remote
Method Invoation (RMI) whih is more friendly to the programmer, but also
removes the property of having only one entry point for APDUs and therefore is
less lear as to whih method may or may not be alled by the host appliation.
Furthermore, as the (serial) ommuniation is already slow, RMI makes the
ommuniation overhead even worse.
Sine the applet has to make use of limited resoures, it tends to be simple.
This is a good thing beause, as noted before, it makes formal veriation fea-
sible. Still, simple things also need interation with real life users. This is where
the host appliation omes in. The user interfae is an important part of the
2
Properties of the APDU mehanism have been formally speied in [19℄.
host appliation beause it denes the user friendliness of the smart ard. User
interfaes thrive on threads to prevent them from loking up when ommunia-
tion with the smart ard is slow or waiting. Its threaded organization enables
the host appliation to give feedbak to the user and, at the same time, maintain
ommuniations with the smart ard. Host appliations might also keep a opy
of the state of the smart ard beause ommuniation is expensive in time. All
these fators ombined make the host appliation a omplex piee of software,
not quite suited for formal veriation, and vulnerable to attaks. Sine we want
to build seure smart ard appliations, both the host appliation and the applet
should be taken into aount.
It is important to distinguish, within the design of the host appliation, the
parts that ontribute to the high-level ommuniation protool. Formal veria-
tion of those parts is possible only if they an be isolated from the parts that are
not relevant to the protool. A well-designed host appliation should also be ro-
bust against attaks. Reasoning about seurity is disussed in the next setions.
For an example of an ad ho protetion against virus attaks, see the VSVPP
disussed in Setion 5.
Extra are should be taken in the design of the host appliation in order to
allow formal veriation. As the host appliation is probably the weakest link of
the protool, it is a likely target for an attak. The example implementation in
Setion 5 illustrates how to design suh a host appliation.
4 Java and Cryptography
Cryptography an be employed in protools to ahieve seurity properties suh
as authentiation, ondentiality, and integrity. The problem of where to safely
store private keys is solved using smart ards. Setion 5 desribes a ase study
involving suh a seurity protool. This setion is meant as an introdution to
the use of ryptography in Java Card and Java.
By default, Java SDK 1.3 ontains lasses dealing with seurity related on-
epts: The Seurity API. For example, the Seurity API ontains the Signature
and MessageDigest lasses. Unfortunately, due to export regulations, the Se-
urity API does not provide lasses to do ryptographi enryption. The Java
Cryptography Extension (JCE) is an API whih should be downloaded separately
and whih supplements the Seurity API with strong ryptography. Fortunately,
due to reent relaxations in the above mentioned export regulations, the JCE
API will be integrated in the upoming release 1.4 of Sun's Java SDK.
The main lass of the JCE API is the Cipher lass. To reate instanes
of the lass, it has a fatory method, that is parameterized with a text string
speifying the algorithm, for instane "DES" or "RSA". A Cipher objet may be
used for enryption and deryption of messages, or for wrapping keys (whih
is, at least for DES and RSA, the same thing as enryption). In ombination
with the MessageDigest lass it an also be used to add signatures to messages,
although the Seurity API provides a more general Signature lass. The Cipher
and Signature lasses need to be initialized with ryptographi keys whih are
supplied by fatory lasses in the Seurity API.
The JCE API is really just an interfae that is to be implemented by dierent
providers. Sun has its own JCE provider, whih will be integrated in Java SDK
1.4. The urrent version of Sun's JCE provider does not provide RSA iphers.
In the ase study in Setion 5 the BounyCastle JCE provider [14℄ is used.This
provider is added to the list of providers by adding the following line to the
java.seurity le in $JDK/jre/lib/seurity diretory:
seurity.provider.1=\
org.bounyastle.je.provider.BounyCastleProvider
Table 1 lists some ryptographi operations from the Seurity and JCE APIs.
It also introdues some high-level seurity protool notation in the last olumn.
A full introdution to suh notation is outside the sope of this paper, instead
see, for example, [1℄. This notation is used in Setion 5 to speify the seurity
protool used in the ase study.
Table 1. Notation for Java ryptographi operations.
Operation Class Notation
Enrypting Cipher fmg
k
Derypting Cipher  
Wrapping keys Cipher fk
1
g
k
2
Unwrapping keys Cipher  
Signing Signature fmg
priv
P
Verifying signatures Signature  
Message Digesting MessageDigest (m)
Conatenating   hm
1
i
m
2
On the ard side, the ryptography API whih is part of the Java Card
2.1 API is similar in style to the ryptographi lasses provided by the JCE
API. Of ourse, Java Card only provides a xed set of algorithms. There is also
the separation of the API into a seurity pakage (lasses for signing messages
and omputing message digests) and a ryptography pakage (lasses for strong
ryptography). Some of the ards suer from the export rules. For instane, as
mentioned in the previous setion, the international version of the GemXpresso
ard does not feature RSA enryption beause of these rules. The Java Card
2.0 iButtons do not ontain a ryptographi API omparable to JCE, however
their API allows diret aess to the ryptographi oproessor whih features
operations suh as modular arithmeti and exponentiation. Implementing RSA
enryption with these primitives is quite simple. However, during implementa-
tion of the ase study disussed in Setion 5, some very low-level programming
was required to ensure that the iButtons and the Java Card 2.1 ards ompute
similar signatures. For example, both the iButtons and the Palmera ards re-
quire that the publi exponent of the RSA key pair is one byte, a property not all
JCE providers ensure. Another example, it seems that the SHA message digest
algorithm on the Java Card iButton diers from the SHA message digest in JCE
in that the resulting bytes have to be swapped in groups of four to get the same
result.
5 The Case Study: Eletroni Voting
The ase study presented in this setion is an implementation of a drastially
simplied eletroni voting protool. In the near future, asting a vote in an
eletion will no longer require a voter to visit a physial voting station. Instead, a
vote an be ast from the voter's PC at home. The PC sends the vote information
over the Internet to a entral server whih keeps trak of the eletion result. There
are a number of potential problems against whih the voting protool should be
proteted. Only three problems are disussed here.
First, the vote information should remain a seret, this means that only the
server should reeive the vote information that is sent by the voter. This property
is known as ondentiality. Obviously, the vote information an be enoded using
publi key ryptography before it is sent over the Internet.
Seond, only registered voters should be allowed to ast their votes. The re-
sult of the voting proess should reet the hoies of the registered voters, and
the registered voters only. These properties are known as authentiation and
integrity. This also an be implemented using publi key ryptography. Every
registered voter reeives a smart ard by ordinary mail. The smart ard rypto-
graphially signs the vote before it is sent to the server.
Third, not even the voter's PC should be trusted. Or, put dierently, the
host appliation is not part of the trusted omputer base. Think, for example,
of a virus whih infets the voter's PC prior to the eletion period. On eletion
day the virus beomes ative and may irumvent the ryptographi protetions
desribed above. The virus might, for instane, read the vote and send it to
some third party, thus violating the ondentiality property. Worse yet, it might
send a ompletely dierent vote to the smart ard for signing. The server would
aept the vote sine it was signed by a legitimate smart ard. This would violate
the integrity of the eletion result. A solution to this problem uses a personal
vote list, on whih the list of parties is permuted in a way that is unique for the
voter's id. Eah of the voter's hoies is thus enoded, and the voter enters the
vote ode into the GUI, rather than the hoie itself. A virus might interept the
vote ode, and start a \vote thread" with a hanged vote ode, but it annot
intensionally hange the outome of the eletion. Moreover, if the vote odes are
hosen from a large enough set of odes, it is extremely unlikely that it hoses
a vote ode whih is valid for the partiular voter id. This simple idea is alled
the Voter-Side Virus-Protetion Protool (VSVPP). Of ourse, the server now
needs to maintain a database relating voter ids to vote lists.
Note that many potential problems are not addressed in the above analysis.
For example, denial of servie attaks are ignored. Also, the server is ompletely
trusted. The latter problem an perhaps be solved using a protool whih dis-
tributes trust over several servers, suh as desribed for example in [6℄.
The seurity protool implemented in the voting ase study involves three
prinipals: The applet (A), the host appliation (H), and the server (S). For a
omplete seurity analysis perhaps the voter, the virus, and potential adversaries
on the Internet should be onsidered as well. Figure 2 shows how the protool
works. First, A omputes the signature s, based on the vote v and A's private key
priv
A
. Next, H enrypts the vote v and the signature s using a freshly generated
session key, based on the server's publi key pub
S
, resulting in the message m.
The message m is sent over the Internet to the server, whih is able to deode it,
sine it has the private key priv
S
and A's publi key pub
A
. The diagram shows
virus
id
GUI
\Seure" feedbak hannel
v
s
id
priv
A
priv
S
Voter
m
Internet
pub
A
pub
S
Personal vote list
vote
thread
Applet Host Appliation Server
Fig. 2. Overview of the voting system.
where the publi keys pub
A
, pub
S
are needed. It should be assumed, however,
(as is ommon) that all involved prinipals know all publi keys. The trusted
omputer base inludes the applet and the server, but not the host appliation.
The keys pub
A
and priv
A
are loaded only one onto the smart ard during
initialization. One the keys are present, the applet an be used to sign pakets.
The paket v that gets sent to the applet for signing is omposed as follows:
v =
id 10
vote ode 2
email 40
gsm 8
padding 4
In total v ontains 64 bytes. The applet rst omputes a 20 byte SHA message
digest, and then enrypts it with its 128 byte (or 1024 bit) RSA private key
priv
A
to get the 128 byte signature s.
Rather than use pub
S
to diretly enrypt the vote information, rst a session
key des is generated. The session key des is wrapped, that is enrypted with,
pub
S
and sent to the server. Suh a session key is normally used to help ensure
non-repudiation. In this ase, however, it is used beause the message hvi
s
gets
too large to be enrypted by a 128 byte RSA key. The vote v and signature s are
thus enrypted with des to obtain the message m whih gets sent to the server.
The server S unwraps the session key des and deodes m to obtain v and
s. The signature s is veried by derypting s using pub
A
, omputing the SHA
message digest of v and omparing the two results. In ase they are equal, S
updates the eletion result aordingly and sends an aknowledgment message
bak to H . Additionally, S sends the information it reeived over a \seure"
feedbak hannel to the voter. In the implementation this hannel is implemented
by sending email or an SMS message (through the GSM network) to the voter.
In onventional seurity protool notation, as introdued in Setion 4, the
total protool reads as follows:
A ! H : id (1)
H ! A : v (2)
A ! H : f(v)g
priv
A
=: s (3)
H ! S : fdesg
pub
S
(4)
H ! S : fhvi
s
g
des
=:m (5)
S ! H : ak=deny (6)
Seurity protools like this, one formalized, an be analysed using formal meth-
ods suh as BAN logi [3℄. An interesting issue, not addressed here, is how to
bridge the gap between the formal version of the seurity protool and the atual
implementation.
6 Conlusions and Future Work
The main result of the work desribed in this paper, apart from a working
smart ard appliation, is insight into the issues involved in designing suh an
appliation. For instane, one of the unforeseen problems is that, although the
applet part of the appliation remains quite simple, the host appliation part
beomes inreasingly omplex. Although the host appliation is usually not part
of the trusted omputer base, one typially wants it to be orret anyway. The
issues involved in designing suh an appliation have beome muh learer during
the implementation work.
Another lesson we learned is, that even though standards like Java Card, the
OpenCard Framework, and Visa Open Platform provide interoperability and
bring with them the promise of reusable ode, in pratie the development of
ross platform smart ard appliations still requires a lot of hard work. This
is due to slight dierenes in the available interfaes. Espeially working with
dierent ryptographi libraries (both on-ard and o-ard) an be a burden.
As for veriation, the work desribed here was done in the LOOP group
in Nijmegen. This group fouses on the development and use of the LOOP tool
[11℄, a front end for theorem provers suh as PVS [17℄. The tool translates Java
soure les into mathematial PVS models. Goal is formal veriation of Java
appliations whose behavior is speied using the modeling language JML [13℄
whih essentially is a Hoare-like annotation language based on Java expressions
with some extras. Some aademi, yet onrete, examples have already been
veried [10, 2, 19℄. Reently, we started looking at Java Card within the ontext
of the European VeriCard projet, whih is oordinated from Nijmegen. Java
Card oers unique opportunities to show that formal veriation is feasible.
Sine smart ards only provide limited resoures, the appliations on the smart
ard have to be very small and memory eÆient. This puts us bak in the 8-bit-
proessor era.
The voting ase study is not formally veried in this way. Sine the ase
study implements a seurity protool, it seems that high-level seurity protool
veriation is more appropriate, as opposed to low-level veriation of orret-
ness. While high-level seurity analysis is an important new area of interest, we
believe that abstrating away from the low-level details is a bad idea, as attaks
our on all levels. We feel that low-level veriation of orretness should serve
as a basis for high-level seurity protool veriation. How the two an be om-
bined, espeially in the ontext of automated theorem proving suh as in [18℄,
remains an interesting problem for future researh.
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